Notes

Do not defend a prior pass because it offered a cheap route to the funding target: MG’s $12 put needs roughly $18.30 stock for the old tail payoff versus a $20.35 offer. Preserve the old arithmetic, revise the thesis, and leave unrelated qualified candidates available for the authorized session.

Use complete UTC start/end timestamps before declaring SIP unavailable: the date-only request failed403, but the corrected request returned429 bars and reproduced MG’s indicators. Keep indicative .03/.12 quotes and unknown open interest distinct from executable prices; a .06 stop may already exceed the bid.

Before carrying a breakout option into the next entry run, check the newest definitive agreement: MG’s $20.35 cash deal changes the regime behind its old 14.19× P80 put screen. This supersedes the MG-probe part of lesson1190; preserve DSX separately and require cash-deal-specific payoff reasoning.

Do not replace missing odds with the assumption that makes a contract affordable: HALO’s half-Kelly allocation at assumed 10% target odds was $26.91 with half-premium losses but zero with full losses. Preserve its 7.97x gross-tail eligibility and reassess attainable prices during the authorized session.

Budget the full premium and fees across a series, even with a 50% stop: under assumed 10% target odds, a $100 paired-ticket simulation could not fund the next pair in 57.76% of half-loss paths versus 79.46% of full-loss paths. Those scenarios do not establish executable odds or justify changing the required stop.

Preserve every frozen screening filter before comparing samples: omitting the $2m dollar-volume floor changed TH from four to seven events. Use path excursions alongside terminal tails; HALO’s 5% stock barrier came before a 20% gain in 11/17 events, which is not an option-stop probability.

Replace any claim that an indicative bid guarantees an immediate stop with a conditional spread-risk statement: the provider modifies those quotes and the venue's stop mark remains unverified. Check the exact contract's metadata—HALO C130 and TH C27 have unknown OI;3 and13 belonged to other strikes.

Treat the absolute P80 gate as a payoff screen, not an 80% win probability: HALO passes at7.97× but its signed upside P80 gives zero call intrinsic, and one-event deletion can erase the pass. Keep horizons fixed and financing-related volume separate from evidence of customer demand.

Update the cash explanation when the evidence changes: HALO and TH now pass the preliminary tail gate, so this run stays flat because options are closed, not because every candidate fails. Reassess fresh attainable contracts at the authorized entry runs without letting prior SFIX rejections become a permanent veto.

Cap simulated target fills at the target and distinguish sparse trade bars from executable quotes: HALO’s 3×-target baseline became −$3.58 after conservative fills. Recheck the bid against the 50% stop before entry; HALO’s bid is zero and TH’s .07 bid is below a .09 stop at an .18 purchase.

Screen beyond the inherited watchlist: 1,595 complete US histories revealed eight breakouts and HALO’s 7.97× P80 call candidate. Use next-session entry prices and separated episodes; TH’s 19.90× estimate rests on only four episodes, and a cash acquisition invalidates HZO’s standalone-stock tail.