Stats

The automated trading fund manager performed an edge test on several stocks, including PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific option contracts and prices, such as PLAY S8.17 Oct16C10.40/P7.50, which require a 27.294982% increase or 20.440636% decrease. The test also included VRA S3.05 Oct16P2.5.10, which requires a 21.311475% decrease, and SFIX S2.85 Oct16P2.5.15, which requires a 17.543860% decrease. The results showed that all of these tests failed to meet the 40% threshold, with no documented actual-option expected payout greater than or equal to 3 times the investment. The manager used data from issuer schedules, event observations, and websites such as https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/option-bars. The manager also checked the Nasdaq listing census, which included 13,176 non-test unique listings, and excluded 384 non-standard strings. The manager produced 147 US-listed leads from four secondary weekly calendars from September 14 to October 5, but the calendar coverage was incomplete. The manager probed 31 distinct option catalogs, but not all 13,176 listings were fully event-tested. The manager also tested other stocks, such as BB, ABAT, and MANU, with specific option contracts and prices. The manager considered foreign stocks, including 9961.HK, 7203.T, and SAP.DE, but the sample was not a global census. The manager chose cash because the validated payoff was absent, not because the broad markets lack volatility. The manager did not place an order and did not justify a new fund.

An edge test was conducted on four stocks: PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM. The test results for each stock are as follows: PLAY's October 16 call option with a strike price of $10 and a premium of $0.40, and its put option with a strike price of $7 and a premium of $0.50, require a price change of +27.294982% and -20.440636% respectively, with a median absolute change of 10.624339%. VRA's October 16 put option with a strike price of $2.5 and a premium of $0.10 requires a price change of -21.311475%, with a median absolute change of 10.350471%. SFIX's October 16 put option with a strike price of $2.5 and a premium of $0.15 requires a price change of -17.543860%, with a median absolute change of 16.578014%. TCOM's October 16 call option with a strike price of $45 and a premium of $0.32, and its put option with a strike price of $35 and a premium of $0.48, require a price change of +17.105943% and -10.801034% respectively, with a median absolute change of 4.590973%. All of these options failed to meet the 40% threshold, and there were no documented actual option expected payouts greater than or equal to 3 times the investment. The sources used for this analysis include issuer schedules, event observations, and data from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars, as well as catalog closes dated September 9 checked with September 10 delayed bars. The possible scenarios for each stock are: 1. PLAY's weak visits leading to lower store cash, reduced new store and vendor orders, and landlords and creditors capturing more cash, with a counter case of food growth or turnaround stabilizing visits. 2. VRA's improved sell-through leading to less inventory cash locked, reinvestment in brand and distribution, and supplier and shareholder recovery, with a counter case of promotion-dependent growth reversing margin. 3. SFIX's client growth leading to better fixed cost absorption, larger free cash flow and buyback capacity, and equity re-rating, with a counter case of higher ad spend and returns consuming incremental revenue. 4. TCOM's regulatory constraints leading to lower merchant take or compliance cost, hotel bargaining power, and margin mix and cross-border capital allocation change, with no asserted new law effect due to the unread July decision. The sources and baselines used for this analysis include news releases from the companies' investor relations websites. These scenarios are conditional first, second, and third-order effects, not measured probabilities, and the facts stop at reported financials, with priced improvement and market reaction unknown. All four strikes fail directional coverage, with no cross-company correlation assumed independent and no order.

An edge test was conducted on several stocks, including PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific option prices and requirements. For example, PLAY's Oct16C10 option requires a 27.294982% increase, while VRA's Oct16P2.5 option requires a 21.311475% decrease. All of these options failed to meet their requirements, with no documented actual-option expected payout greater than or equal to 3 times the investment. The test used data from issuer schedules, event observations, and websites such as https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and https://ir.daveandbusters.com/news-releases/news-release-details/dave-busters-reports-first-quarter-2026-financial-results. The test also considered financial data from the companies, including revenue, net income, and adjusted EBITDA. For instance, PLAY's revenue was 559.2m, a 1.5% decrease, while VRA's revenue was 55.7m, a 7.8% increase. The test concluded that no verified current EV/share count or fully adjusted earnings multiples were built, making valuation unknown. The beneficiaries of these stocks include landlords who finance PLAY, customers and vendors who benefit from turnaround spending, and shareholders who need cash after reinvestment. These facts do not satisfy the option payoff gate, and counterexamples rewrite one-sided bear prior. No order was placed.

An edge test was performed on several stocks, including PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific option prices and dates, such as PLAY S8.17 Oct16C10.40/P7.50, which require a 27.294982% increase or a 20.440636% decrease. The test results showed that all of these options failed to meet the required criteria, with no documented actual option expected payout greater than or equal to 3 times the premium. The sources used for this test include issuer schedules and data from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars. The data was checked with delayed bars from September 10. Calculations were made using Wilder 14 RSI, which is a measure of stock price volatility, and ATR, which stands for Average True Range, a measure of stock price movement, as well as 20/50 SMA, which refers to Simple Moving Average, a measure of stock price trend. The results of these calculations for each stock are as follows: for PLAY, the RSI14 was 35.73768198709139, the ATR14 was 0.5767722089866175, and the RV20_ann_pct, which is the 20-day annualized log return volatility, was 69.80237704694696. Similar calculations were made for TCOM, VRA, and SFIX. All of the stocks were found to be below their 20/50 SMA, with TCOM and SFIX also being below their prior 20-day low. The RSI14 for TCOM and SFIX was found to be oversold, at 22.724174520833685 and 29.483216244943506, respectively. However, this does not necessarily mean that the prices will reverse, as oversold conditions can continue. The range and RSI are not sufficient to determine the distribution of event moves, and cannot replace the need for same-kind events or executable option backtests. In fact, counterexamples of oversold bounces can harm put options. In order to achieve a 3R net full premium risk, the targets would need to be at least 4 times the premium, but the empirical medians do not support this. No stop or target was invented for the rejected orders.

An edge test was conducted on several stocks, including PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific option contracts. The test required a certain percentage return for each stock, with results showing that all failed to meet the 40% threshold. The test used historic event close returns mapped to current stock prices, with put intrinsic value calculated as the maximum of the strike price minus the next stock price, or zero, divided by the premium. The test also used a residual time value that was not modeled, so the results are a stress floor and not the expected traded option price. The test was run with 10,000 independent and identically distributed paths, a 3% equity premium compounded, and no option fees or serial dependence. The results showed that none of the stocks had a documented actual option expected payout of 3 times or more. The test also used a grid log utility with a full Kelly criterion of 0 for all floor distributions, and a half Kelly criterion of 0. The results showed that SFIX had one scenario with a gross return of 5.1653 times, but the mean return was 0.95357 times, which was insufficient. The current allocation is 0, and the account has an absolute premium cap of 51.0594, a normal cap of 25.5297, and a conviction cap of 42.5495. The results also showed that three premiums of 51.0594 would exactly use 18% of the cap, so a strictly less amount should be used if the absolute caps ever bind.

A news scan found the headline about SFIX being a costed event-run-up stock proxy, with an unproven option edge. An edge test was done on several stocks, including PLAY, VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific option prices and dates, such as PLAY's Oct 16 C 10 at $0.40 and P 7 at $0.50, which required a 27.294982% and -20.440636% change, respectively. The test results showed that all of these failed to meet a 40% threshold, with no documented actual option expected payout greater than or equal to 3 times the initial investment. The sources of this information include issuer schedules and data from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars, with catalog closes dated September 9 checked with September 10 delayed bars. The premises of this test include a daily close-marked portfolio with an initial value of $1000, full stock notional, and long or short direction with a 2, 3, or 5 session lag sweep. The results of the test for SFIX, with a lag of 5 and a long direction, showed a return of 20.80233886442895 and a drawdown of 10.53865980656219 during the training phase, and a return of 9.472963631986762 and a drawdown of 6.811989100817417 during the holdout phase. However, the two holdout trades were not enough to establish a stable expectancy, and the positive underlying proxy did not model option theta, vega, or spread. There were no actual option historical returns, and no strategy was adopted.

The automated trading fund manager tested the stock of TCOM as a proxy for an event. The test involved buying and selling options of TCOM and other stocks, including PLAY, VRA, and SFIX, to see if the strategy would work. The manager used a computer program to analyze the data and make decisions. A key concept used here is 'option edge', which refers to the potential profit from buying and selling options. The test results showed that the strategy did not work well for any of the stocks, with required price changes of +27.294982% and -20.440636% for PLAY, -21.311475% for VRA, -17.543860% for SFIX, and +17.105943% and -10.801034% for TCOM. The manager used a'vectorbt daily close-marked portfolio' which is a way of tracking the performance of a group of stocks, and'slippage' which refers to the difference between the expected and actual price of a trade. The manager also used 'lag' which means waiting for a certain number of sessions before making a trade. The results were not good enough to adopt the strategy, with no trades showing a return of more than three times the investment. The manager also noted that the strategy did not take into account the 'theta','vega', and'spread' of the options, which are measures of their price and risk. The manager decided not to use this strategy because it did not work well and did not have enough historical data to support it. A news scan found the data used in the test, which included issuer schedules and stock prices from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars.

The automated trading fund manager tested the stock VRA as a proxy for an event. The test used options, which are contracts that give the buyer the right to buy or sell a stock at a certain price, to see if they could make a profit. The manager looked at the options for VRA with a strike price of $2.5 and an expiration date of October 16. The test required the stock price to move up or down by a certain percentage, specifically 21.311475%, in order to make a profit. However, the test failed to show a profit, with a median absolute percentage change of 10.350471%. The manager also tested other stocks, including PLAY, SFIX, and TCOM, but all of them failed to show a profit. The manager used data from the issuer's schedules and websites, including https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars, to make the tests. The manager assumed that the portfolio would start with $1000 and that the fees for buying and selling would be 10 basis points, or 0.1%, and that the slippage, or difference between the expected and actual prices, would also be 10 basis points. The manager trained the model using a sample of 10 events and then tested it on 2 holdout events, but the results were not stable and did not show a clear profit. The manager also found that the stock price could move in the opposite direction of the option price, resulting in a loss. Therefore, the manager did not adopt the strategy. A news scan found the data line: the manager did not use a technical screener strategy to select the stocks.

The automated trading fund manager tested the stock PLAY as a proxy for an event. The test involved buying and selling options for PLAY and other stocks, including VRA, SFIX, and TCOM, with specific prices and dates, such as the Oct16C10 option for PLAY at $0.40. The test required certain percentage changes in the stock prices, for example, +27.294982% for PLAY, but all the tests failed to meet the 40% threshold. The manager used data from issuer schedules and websites, including https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars, and made assumptions about fees and slippage. The manager trained a model on historical data, with parameters such as a 2-session lag and long direction, and evaluated its performance on two holdout events. However, the results were not stable, and the manager did not adopt the strategy due to the lack of historical returns data for actual options and the potential for option losses even with positive stock direction. A news scan found the data, which is a raw script output.

A test was done on TCOM's earnings coverage, which is a way to measure how well a stock's options reflect its potential price movement. The test looked at the cost of options for TCOM, specifically the October 16 call option at $45 and the September 10 put option at $35, which cost $32 and $48 respectively. The test required a 17.105943% increase or a 10.801034% decrease in the stock price to be considered successful. The results showed that 0 out of 8 call options and 2 out of 8 put options met this requirement, which is 25% of the total. The median absolute percentage change was 4.590973%. The test used the stock's closing price on September 15 as a reference point and did not consider any intraday lows. The test also used historical data from a website, but the data was incomplete and not representative of the stock's full potential. The test found that the current options contracts do not provide enough coverage, with less than 40% of the contracts meeting the required criteria. Additionally, there was no documented evidence of an expected payout of at least 3 times the cost of the option. The test also found that the expiry date of October 16 is more than 7 days after the event. While it is possible for residual option time value to pay out despite the lack of intrinsic coverage, there is no historical evidence to support this. Therefore, the test conditionally rejected the options contract. The test's soundness is limited by stale market data, sparse samples, and changes in market conditions. To reconsider the contract, new evidence is needed, such as a more affordable contract with at least 40% directional coverage or a documented expected payoff of at least 3 times the cost.

A test was done on Stitch Fix, ticker symbol SFIX, to see if it was a good idea to buy a certain type of contract, called an option, that would expire on October 16. The test looked at the price of the option, $15, and the potential profit, 2.5, and the cost, $0.15, as of September 9. It also looked at the percentage of times the stock price went up or down by a certain amount, 17.543860%, and the average amount it went up or down, 16.578014%. The test used the stock price on September 22 and the next day, September 23, to make its decision. It also looked at the company's schedule for announcing its financial results, which can be found on its website. The test found that the option did not meet certain conditions, such as having a high enough chance of making a profit, at least 40%, or having a high enough potential payout, at least 3 times the cost. Because of this, the test decided not to buy the option. The test also noted that the sample of data used was not complete and may not be representative of the stock's performance. The test will reconsider buying the option if it finds a cheaper one with a higher chance of making a profit or a higher potential payout.

A test was done on Vera Bradley's earnings, using the S3.05 Oct 16 P2.5.10 Sep 9 contract, which costs $10. This test requires a -21.311475% change, with no closes above the strike price, and a median absolute change of 10.350471%. The test started on September 15 at 8 ET, after the company's earnings release on September 14. The test used the previous close as the starting point and did not consider intraday lows. The test also used historical data from the primary issuer and daily stock bars. However, the sample was incomplete due to missing data for some stocks. The test found that the coverage was below 40% and there was no expected payout of 3 times or more. Since the hurdle exceeded the absolute median, there was no exception to hold the position. The expiry date of October 16 was more than 7 days after the event. Although it is possible for residual option time value to pay out despite lack of intrinsic coverage, there was no costed history to establish this. Therefore, the test resulted in a valid rejection. The test's soundness was limited by stale marks, sparse samples, and regime changes. To reconsider, there would need to be a newer, more affordable contract with at least 40% directional coverage or a documented expected payoff of 3 times or more. No order was placed.

A test was done on twelve earnings reports from AMC, which is a company that issues reports, from September 2023 to June 2026. The test looked at how the stock price changed after each report, from the close of the day of the report to the close of the next day. The median change was 10.624339%, and the changes ranged from -20.081522% to 17.742559%. For example, on September 10, the stock price was 8.17, and on October 16, the price of a call option, which is a type of contract that gives the buyer the right to buy a stock at a certain price, was 10. The test also looked at the price of a put option, which is a type of contract that gives the buyer the right to sell a stock at a certain price, and found that it implied a 27.294982% increase in the stock price on September 10, and a -20.440636% decrease on October 16. The test found that none of the twelve earnings reports met two criteria for being affordable in October, which were that the stock price had to increase by at least 40% and that the option payoff had to be at least three times the premium, which is the price of the option contract. The test also found that the strike price, which is the price at which the option can be exercised, of the put option was 7, and that the distance between the strike price and the current stock price was 14.320685%, plus the premium of 6.119951%, which consumed the tail of the event, meaning that it made it unlikely that the stock price would move far enough to make the option profitable. The test was based on three premises: that the dates of the earnings reports were taken from the primary schedules, that the daily responses were frozen at the close of the day, not at the best low price, and that the contract expiry was 32 days after the September 14 event, which satisfies a week buffer but leaves residual value unmodeled. The test found that this empirical hurdle, which is a test of how well a strategy works, failed. It is not valid to infer that the actual option price equals the intrinsic value, which is the value of the option if it were exercised immediately, or that the future win probability is 0%. A counterexample could be a future turnaround shock or an increase in implied volatility, which is a measure of how much the stock price is expected to move, that could exceed history and would need an independent costed valuation. The test did not select a direction based on the outcome, and the chronological archive of four pages did not have a return filter, which means that it did not select only the reports with a certain return. The test also noted that post-pandemic, capital structure, and regime shifts limit exchangeability, which means that it is not possible to compare the results directly to other results. A hypothetical default exit on September 11 would have required a move that exceeds the median 9.816297% put and 16.670642% call. There was no live order, meaning that no actual trade was made. The sources of the data were the issuer's website, https://ir.daveandbusters.com/news-releases/news-release-details/dave-busters-entertainment-inc-report-second-quarter-2026, and /data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars, and the catalog was via option_contracts.

A news scan found the headline about an automated trading fund manager's notes. The manager performed an edge test on MLKN, which is a stock ticker, on October 16, with a reference price of $17.5 and a price of $28 on September 9, and $20.80 on September 10, requiring a -17.211538% change. The manager also looked at eight issuer-dated earnings close moves, with a median absolute change of 10.745876%, and coverage of 1/8, which is 12.5%, less than 40%. The manager also considered intraday lows, which were also 1/8. The manager froze HITI, another stock ticker, with a median absolute change of 5.494505%, and a price of $2.56, requiring a +9.765625% or -8.593750% change. The manager's goal was to find an affordable dated-event long call or put with a defensible asymmetric payoff. The manager started with an account equity of $850.99, Convex cash of $178.71, no positions, queued orders, or closed trades. The manager considered several stocks, including MLKN, HITI, HAIN, ZUMZ, GRAL, SRRK, EPMC, and ACB, but none met the criteria. The manager concluded that no allocation was possible and retained the cash of $178.71 due to failed eligibility and payoff. The manager noted that a strong counterargument could be that an unseen fat-tail winner could pay for a series, but an honest estimate would only suffice after a mandatory gate, and none qualified. The manager also noted that normal premium, high conviction, and absolute values were below the required thresholds. The manager did not invent stops or orders and considered the full premium as the loss budget. The manager's hypothetical net target for MLKN required an intrinsic stock price of $16.38, which was not defended by a live forecast. The manager's default pre-event exit was set for September 21 for MLKN and September 11 for HITI and HAIN. The manager's current hurdle for MLKN exceeded the median by 6.465662%, so no hold exception was made. The manager's sources included primary dates, option contracts, and stock bars from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and /data/option-bars. The manager monitored 231 resolved issues, 220/221 retained, 242/243 MLKN, and 24402 UTC added, and GRAL/SRRK review was added. The manager's job 19222 UTC actual END was verified, and midnight receipt was pending, not assumed failed. The manager tested a new job 199240 min 72 runs, which collected MLKN and ZUMZ stock and options through September 23, and live completion must be audited. The manager found no outside-mandate operation within an independent edge and no FUND proposal.

A test of the stock MLKN found that its intrinsic stress has zero half-Kelly, which is a measure of the optimal fraction of a portfolio to invest in a stock, and its residual option value remains unmodeled, meaning it is not accounted for. The test looked at the stock's price on September 9 and 10, and found that it would require a -17.211538% move to reach the option's strike price of 17.5. The test also looked at the stock's past earnings close moves, and found that the median absolute move was 10.745876%, with only 12.5% of the moves being covered by the option, which is a low coverage rate. The test also found that the option's premium, or price, was 0.28, and that the stock's price would need to be at or below 16.38 for the option to be in the money, which is only 1/8 of the historical closes. The test used a bootstrap simulation, which is a statistical method, with 10,000 paths and a 3% equity premium compounded, and found that the median return was -28.12351%, and the 5th percentile return was -45.62057%, with a profit odds of 9.38%. The test also found that the half-Kelly fraction, which is the optimal fraction of a portfolio to invest in a stock, was zero, and that the option's price would need to be at least 1.12 for it to be a good investment, but this price is not supported by the data. The test used data from the option contracts and stock bars from the website https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars, and the issuer's dates 23055/23066–73.

A news scan found the headline that MillerKnoll schedules a conference call. An edge test for MLKN, which is a stock ticker, was done using a reference price of 17.5 on October 16 and a price of 20.80 on September 10, which requires a decrease of 17.211538%. This test looked at eight past earnings reports and found that the median absolute change in the stock price was 10.745876%, but the coverage, which means how many times the test was done, was only 12.5%, which is less than 40%. The test also looked at the lowest prices during the day and found that they were also only 12.5% of the time. Another stock, HITI, was used as a comparison and had a median absolute change of 5.494505%. The test was done to see if a bearish, or negative, view of the stock before an event would support a put option, which is a type of investment that gives the owner the right to sell a stock at a certain price, run-up, or increase in price. The test used a vectorbt portfolio, which is a type of investment portfolio, with 1000 initial cash, full stock notional, which means the full value of the stock, and 10 basis points fees, which is a type of fee, and 10 basis points lippage, which is a type of cost, on each side of the trade. The test was done on six events in 2024-25 and two events in 2026, with no selection of holdouts, which are events that are not used to train the model. The results of the test were: a return of -3.997024599531062 and a drawdown, which is the maximum loss, of 6.0269945892936665 for the training phase, and a return of -1.973521635520217 and a drawdown of 4.115226417384676 for the holdout phase. All variants of the test lost money in both the training and holdout phases. This test was for research only and did not model option IV, theta, or spreads, which are types of option metrics, or borrow cost, which is the cost of borrowing money to buy a stock, or 15-minute stops, which is a type of trading rule. The current BMO, or before market open, timing is different from the historic AMC, or after market close, timing, so the results may not be the same. A counterexample is that option volatility expansion could outperform the stock, but historical option prices are needed to test this. The test initially failed due to a serialization issue with NumPy int64, but was fixed by using explicit int and rerunning with NUMBA_DISABLE_JIT=1. No economic changes were made. The source of the data is an upcoming news release from MillerKnoll.

An edge test was done on MLKN Oct16 P17.5, which is a type of option, with a reference price of 0.28 on Sep9 and a stock price of 20.80 on Sep10. This test requires a price decrease of 17.211538%. The test looked at eight instances of earnings reports and their effect on the stock price, with a median absolute change of 10.745876% and coverage of 12.5%, which is less than 40%. The test also looked at intraday lows, which were also 1/8. HITI, a type of stock, had a frozen N9 median absolute change of 5.494505%, and a ratio of C.31 to P.16 at a stock price of 2.56, which requires a price increase of 9.765625% or a decrease of 8.593750%. The test found that neither MLKN nor HITI had an expected option payoff of more than three times the premium. The test looked at three stages of consequences for MLKN: weaker orders and expense growth could cause earnings guidance to be cut, less operating cash could reduce buybacks and store capital expenditures and supplier orders, and financing costs or bargaining power could shift value from equity to creditors. A countercase is that pull-forward normalization and sales pricing could restore cash. The test also looked at who benefits from the current growth strategy and found that store landlords, suppliers, and management growth objectives benefit, but only profitable conversion benefits equity. The test looked at three stages of consequences for ZUMZ: negative comparable sales pressure gross profit, inventory markdowns and cash preservation change brand orders, and store closures or capital restraint could transfer demand to rivals. A countercase is that holiday recovery could happen. The test looked at three stages of consequences for HITI: final cash conversion rather than pre-announced growth drives incremental news, weak conversion needs financing for expansion, and dilution could let scale grow while per-share value falls. A countercase is that working capital unwind could happen. The test looked at three stages of consequences for SRRK: alternate facility approval or delay changes launch timing, availability changes commercial spending and patient access, and cash runway and competitive timing change. The test found that a strong bear case against cash is that one binary winner can outweigh many small premiums, but a counterargument to waiting is correct in principle but requires an eligible payoff, not a monthly shortfall. The test found that current known premium caps of 25.5297%, 42.5495%, and 51.0594% constrain whole contracts, and missed events are not proof of expected value. The sources used in the analysis are the original issuer documents and observations from 23053 to 62, especially the news releases from Miller Knoll and Zumiez.

The edge test for MLKN, which is a stock ticker, on October 16 with a price of 17.5 and a reference price of 0.28 on September 9, and a price of 20.80 on September 10, requires a decrease of 17.211538%. This is a risk assessment, which is a way to evaluate potential dangers. There were eight issuer-dated earnings close moves, with a median absolute change of 10.745876%, and coverage of 1/8, which is 12.5%, less than 40%. Intraday lows were also 1/8. HITI, another stock ticker, had a median absolute change of 5.494505% on November 9, with a price of 2.56, requiring an increase of 9.765625% or a decrease of 8.593750%. Close coverage was 1/9 each, and put daily low was 4/9, which is a hindsight path only. Neither document expected an option payoff, which is the profit from an option, to be greater than or equal to 3 times the premium, which is the cost of the option. There are no open holdings or queued orders, as this is an attack on the watchlist and cash, not an exit maintenance. The numbered premises are: 1. MLKN's fiscal year 2026 sales increased by 4.7%, but the cash flow from operations was 199.9 million, versus 209.3 million, a decrease of 4.4912%. The net debt was 1083 million, and the covenant EBITDA, which is a measure of a company's profitability, was 387.4 million, resulting in a ratio of 2.80x. The fourth quarter organic orders decreased by 6.9%, and expenses rose, making the strongest bear case that growth is failing to cover store investment and interest. A counterexample is that prior order pull-forward of 55-60 million distorts the comparison, and 571.7 million liquidity includes revolver, with maturities of 25.1 million in fiscal year 2027, which is far below liquidity and not imminent distress. Cash of 167.7 million is distinct from liquidity. Do not mislabel 115.6 million investing outflow as actual capital expenditure, which is the money spent on assets; fiscal year 2027 planned capital expenditure is 125-135 million only. 2. ZUMZ's first half cash flow from operations was -27.276 million, and capital expenditure was 4.880 million, resulting in a free cash flow of -32.156 million, and quarter-to-date comparisons were -3.5%; the strongest bear case is weak demand plus buybacks of 23.2 million in the second quarter at 19.30, which erodes cash flexibility. A counterexample is that first half seasonality and holiday recovery can reverse working capital. 3. HITI's prior second quarter free cash flow was 1.5 million, versus EBITDA of 13.9 million, which is 10.79%, and the August 4 pre-announcement makes growth headline insufficient; a counterexample is cash unwind. 4. SRRK's August 21 issuer alternate facility progress does not guarantee approval; the strongest bear case is regulatory delay and additional burn, and a counterexample is that an accepted alternate facility could enable launch. No quantitative approval probability is claimed. Validity: operating weakness can raise equity risk, which is the risk of losing money on stocks; soundness limit: no verified market expectation or current enterprise value or option value bridge, so bearish fundamentals do not prove cheap puts. Sources include news releases from Miller Knoll, Zumiez, and Scholar Rock, as well as primary URLs for HITI. Facts are from issuer originals, and assumptions are limited to consequence inferences.

A news scan found the headline about a completed trading session. The session levels challenge direction without overriding option affordability. An edge test was done on MLKN Oct16 P17.5, which is a type of option, with a reference price of 0.28 on Sep9 and a stock price of 20.80 on Sep10. This requires a decrease of 17.211538%. There were eight issuer-dated earnings close moves, with a median absolute change of 10.745876% and coverage of 1/8, which is 12.5%, less than 40%. The intraday lows were also 1/8. HITI was frozen with a median absolute change of 5.494505% and a ratio of 0.31 to 0.16 at a stock price of 2.56, requiring a change of +9.765625% or -8.593750%. The close coverage was 1/9 each, and the put daily low was 4/9, but this is only visible in hindsight. Neither of the documents expected an option payoff of more than or equal to three times the premium. The premises were based on Sep10 completed SIP daily descriptors stored for 9 symbols in observations 23025 to 33. MLKN had a stock price of 20.8, which is below its Simple Moving Average, or SMA, of 22.71575, with a decrease of 3.9261% on the day, and an Average Daily Range, or ADR, of 0.79, and an Average True Range, or ATR, of 0.8025. The put strike of 17.5 is 4.1772 ADR below the spot price, and the break-even point of 17.22 is 4.5316 ADR below. HITI had a stock price of 2.56, which is above its SMA of 2.4905, despite a decrease of 0.3891% on the day, with an ADR of 0.07847 and an annual Relative Volatility, or RV, of 35.764%, so the trend alone does not choose the put direction. HAIN had an annual RV of 141.625%, which does not remove the standard put K1, with a maximum payout of 0.37 times 2.7027. ZUMZ closed at 16.71, which is below its SMA of 18.02175, before an after-hours price of 13.925, but the fall had already occurred. GRAL had a stock price of 77.56, which is near its SMA of 77.2225, with an ADR of 4.4487, and an affordable put strike of 40 with a premium of 0.35 requires a fall of 48.8783%, which the indicator volatility does not establish. SRRK had a stock price of 55.67, with an increase of 1.9224% on the day, and the nearest put strike of 55 had a cost of 3.70, and the nearest call strike had a cost of 4.30, which is beyond the cap. EPM had a stock price of 3.84, with an increase of 4.0650% on the day, and a cheap call strike of 5 with a premium of 0.03 requires a rise of 30.9896%. ACB and SNDL had stock prices of 3.73 and 1.34, respectively, which are below their SMAs of 3.891 and 1.34875, respectively, with a verified dated event missing. The validity of the technical regimes is context, not an 8-event edge, and a counterexample is a priced binary event that dwarfs the normal ADR. No stops or targets were reset because there were no holdings, and no technical rule was traded. The data can be found at https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and option_contracts.

A test of the stock MLKN found that its put option hurdle failed. The test looked at the stock's price on September 9 and 10, and found that it would need to decrease by 17.211538% to reach the hurdle. The stock's price moved by a median of 10.745876% over eight earnings announcements, but only one of these moves was low enough to reach the hurdle. Another stock, HITI, had a median absolute move of 5.494505% and would need to increase by 9.765625% or decrease by 8.593750% to reach its hurdle. The test found that neither stock's option payoff was expected to be at least three times the premium. The test used a sample of eight earnings announcements from MLKN between June 2024 and June 2026, and found that the stock's price changed by a mean of 0.688355% and a median of 10.745876%. The test also found that the historical intrinsic mean of the stock's option price was 0.604947 times the premium, with a maximum of 4.839577 times the premium. The test concluded that the directional coverage of the option failed, but noted that this does not necessarily mean that the option must lose money. The test also looked at the stock HITI and found that its 95% confidence interval crossed 40%, indicating that the sample size was too small to prove that the option had negative expected value. The test used data from several sources, including the companies' websites and a stock data website.

The automated trading fund manager reviewed the post-close execution. The manager used a reference point called Edge, which looked at the daily responses of issuer-dated earnings, with a median absolute response of 5.494505%. For a specific stock option, S2.56, the manager calculated that it would require a 9.765625% increase or a 8.593750% decrease to be eligible, with each being 1/9 or 11.111% less than 40%. The manager also looked at stocks HAIN, EPM, and ZUMZ, but found no validated comparable-event samples, meaning they are untested. The manager started with $850.99 in equity and $178.71 in cash, with no positions or orders. The goal was to find a qualifying dated event long option, but the payoff was not validated. The manager calculated the normal premium to be 3% or 25.5297, the high conviction premium to be 5% or 42.5495, and the mandate absolute premium to be 6% or 51.0594, with a maximum of 3 lots. The manager also calculated that a full premium risk would require a 3R net profit at 4x the entry price. A news scan found that HAIN had a premium of 37, which was 4.3479% of the equity, but required a high conviction payout of 2.7027x. The manager also looked at EPM and found that the nearest option was stale, and that the stock would need to go up 30.989583% or down 41.40625% to be eligible. The manager decided not to hold any positions and chose to retain cash instead. The next open session will be on September 11 at 13:30 UTC. The manager will review the primary sources on September 14 and 15, and will measure the response of ZUMZ without retrospective fit and fresh HAIN prices only if they have changed. A data line showed that there are no funds outside the mandate identified.

A news scan found the headline about Zumiez's weaker demand and negative first-half cash flow. The company's earnings report showed a decline in sales, with second-quarter comparable sales down 2.1% and quarter-to-date sales down 3.5%. The gross margin was 35.3% compared to 35.5% in the previous year. The company's cash flow from operations was negative $27.276 million, and when subtracting capital expenditures of $4.880 million, the free cash flow was negative $32.156 million. This suggests that weaker demand and fixed costs are putting pressure on the company's cash flow. A counterexample could be a seasonal holiday recovery or a working capital unwind, which could improve the company's cash conversion. The weaker guidance may lead to a repricing of the company's stock, and assortment and inventory decisions may alter supplier orders. Sustained weak cash flow may limit the company's ability to buy back shares and invest in stores. The company's cash retention may help creditors, but discounting may help customers at the expense of margins. The stock price fell 18.013166% to $13.70 after hours, compared to the close of $16.71. The primary source of this information is the company's investor relations website, and the scheduling and prices can be found on the same website and a separate data website.

A same-minute audit of HAIN removed a discount. The coverage of HITI remains frozen. This decision was based on an analysis of daily earnings responses, which had a median absolute change of 5.494505%. On October 16, the stock price was $2.56, and the required change was 9.765625% for a call option and -8.593750% for a put option, with each having a 11.111% chance of happening, which is less than 40%. There were no documented cases of mispricing with a payoff three times the expected amount. The stocks HAIN, EPM, and ZUMZ did not have any comparable events to use as samples in this review. The audit looked at two trades of HAIN stock: one on September 9 at 13:59 with a price of $0.681-$0.6839 and an intrinsic value of $0.3161-$0.319, and another on September 10 at 13:55 with a price of $0.6484-$0.6583 and an intrinsic value of $0.3417-$0.3516. Both trades had prices that exceeded the intrinsic value range for that minute. The empirical responses of HITI were unchanged, with a range of 29-37. The analysis used signed returns, which means it looked at both positive and negative returns. To be valid, four out of nine conditions needed to be met, including a price ceiling of $0.0015525 for a call option and $0.08065934 for a put option, at a fixed stock price of $2.56. The analysis also looked at the soundness of the data, which means it checked if the data was reliable and accurate. One potential issue is that there could be unobserved executable quotes that could change the decision, but none were found. The maximum payout for HAIN was 2.702703 times the premium, which is less than the expected payout and less than the price needed to reach a 3% net target on full premium risk. The size of the trade was 0. The collection of eight events for HAIN was deferred because the current candidate already failed to meet the payoff hard bound, but it was not presented as a failed backtest. The sources used for this analysis include stock and option data from https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/stock-bars and https://runway.adityaperswal.workers.dev/data/option-bars, as well as news releases from Hain Celestial and High Tide Inc.

A news scan found the headline about an automated trading fund manager's notes. The manager closed a call/put option for HITI on October 16 at $0.31/$0.18 on September 9. The underlying stock price was $2.555 as of September 10, 19:20 UTC. The manager calculated the directional break-even point at +9.98043%/-9.19765% and coverage at 11.111% each, which is less than 40%. The median absolute close was 5.494505% and the median absolute gap was 2.34375%. The thresholds exceeded the close median by 4.485925/3.703146 percentage points, so no hold-through exception was made. The manager also looked at other options, including HAIN, EPM, and ZUMZ, but they were preliminary rejections. The manager decided not to make any trades because no screened contract had a certified asymmetric payoff. The premises would change with fresh synchronized prices and at least 8 comparable events satisfying 40% or documented at least 3 times the premium expected payoff after costs. The source dates for the information were September 14 BMO, September 15 AMC, September 10 AMC, and September 14 AMC. The manager used option contracts and delayed SIP bars through 19:20 to make the decisions. Intrinsic-only 4 times premium targets would require the HITI stock to be at $3.74 for a call or $1.78 for a put, but neither was supported by observed closes.

A news scan found the headline about High Tide Inc. announcing its third fiscal quarter 2026 financial results. The HITI Oct16 K2.5 call/put closed at.31/.18 on Sep9. The underlying stock price was 2.555 through Sep10 19:20UTC. The issuer-dated AMC earnings had a directional break-even point of +9.98043% and -9.19765%. The coverage was 1/9, which is 11.111% each, less than 40%. The median absolute close was 5.494505% and the median absolute gap was 2.34375%. The thresholds exceeded the close median by 4.485925 and 3.703146 percentage points, so there was no hold-through exception. A recent put was.16 and still 1/9 at 8.414873%. The intrinsic-only mean payoff was.166696/.471908 times the premium, which is not the option expected value. The premises of the analysis were to scale each of the 9 historical next-session stock close returns to 2.555, compute the call or put value, divide by the reference premium, and subtract 1. This is the intrinsic liquidation floor with time value discarded, not the actual 30+ day remaining option price or expiry return. The analysis used NumPy seed 910 and 10,000 independent and identically distributed bootstrap paths of 20 tickets, with a 3% current equity premium each. The search for fractions 0-6% in 0.01 percentage point steps maximizing mean log growth resulted in 0 for both. The intrinsic sample mean returns were -83.3304% for the call and -52.8092% for the put. The median series returns were -40.0481% and -27.7979%, with a 5th percentile of -44.3359% and -35.8266%. The profit odds were 0% and 0.01%. The analysis notes that residual time value could overturn these figures, so these are rejection stress scenarios, not proof of fair option value. The empirical mandated coverage of 11.1% and missing option value evidence independently reject the option, so the size is 0. One actual call was $31, which is 3.643% of equity, and one actual put was $18, which is 2.115% of equity. The full premium absolute ceiling was $51.0594, the normal 3% was $25.5297, and the high conviction 5% was $42.5495. The primary event is the announcement of High Tide Inc.'s third fiscal quarter 2026 financial results, and the data and nine primary history dates are in the statistical analysis 2301.